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COURT V. ARBITRATOR: WHO SHOULD
DECIDE WHETHER PRELITIGATION
CONDUCT WAIVES THE RIGHT TO COMPEL
AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT?
MICHAEL P. SCHARPF
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, "federal appellate and district courts have
primarily decided the equitable defense of waiver [of arbitration]
themselves, rather than delegating the question to arbitrators."'
The courts' self-imposed responsibility for deciding waiver
remained primarily unquestioned2 until the recent Supreme
Court decision Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.' In the
wake of Howsam, circuits have split over whether Howsam
should be interpreted as (1) giving questions of waiver of
arbitration by litigation conduct and prelitigation conduct to
arbitrators, or (2) favoring the traditional rule that courts should
decide issues of waiver of arbitration by litigation conduct and
prelitigation conduct.4
Waiver is a term that is sometimes used quite loosely to
incorporate many different circumstances in which a party
"loses" the right to compel arbitration. To ensure clarity and for
the purpose of this Note, waiver shall be construed in a more
narrow and precise way to mean the "intentional relinquishment
I J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's University School of Law; B.B.A., 2003,
University of Notre Dame.
1 David LeFevre, Whose Finding Is It Anyway?: The Division of Labor Between
Courts and Arbitrators with Respect to Waiver, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 305, 307 (2006).
2 Id. Deciding waiver regarding arbitration was held to be the responsibility of
the court either "because the power to do so was assumed, or because no party
questioned it." Id.
3 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
4 See LeFevre, supra note 1, at 311-12; see also Lori Turner, Recent
Development, Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
539, 540 (2006).
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of a known right."5 It is this "intentional" aspect of waiver that
sets it apart from terms such as laches,6 forfeiture,7 or
contractual default,8 in that waiver represents not just "losing"
the right to arbitrate but, in fact, voluntarily giving up and
renouncing that right.9
A party can intentionally waive its right to compel
arbitration through litigation conduct and prelitigation conduct.' 0
In both contexts, conduct may be considered a waiver if it "might
be reasonably construed as showing that [parties] do not intend
to avail themselves of such [arbitration]."" Waiver by litigation
conduct focuses on a party's degree of participation in the
litigation process, specifically in regards to motions, discovery,
and evidence. 2 Waiver by prelitigation conduct encompasses
conduct that takes place before, and that is outside the realm of,
litigation activity. An example of such prelitigation conduct
could be a statement made or a letter sent by the party who is
seeking to compel arbitration that is "inconsistent with the
notion that [it has] treated the arbitration provision as in
effect." 3
Circuit courts are split as to whether courts or arbitrators
should decide questions of waiver by litigation conduct and
prelitigation conduct.14 Circuit courts holding that waiver is a
question for arbitrators have done so in regards to both waiver by
litigation conduct and waiver by prelitigation conduct.
Conversely, circuits holding that waiver is a question for the
5 4 AM. JuR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 105 (2009). Black's Law
Dictionary defines waiver as "[tihe voluntary relinquishment or abandonment-
expressed or implied-of a legal right or advantage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768
(3d pocket ed. 2006).
6 See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005)
(characterizing laches as "a doctrine focused on one side's inaction and the other's
legitimate reliance," which "may bar long-dormant claims for equitable relief").
7 "[Florfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right." United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).
' See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 188 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining "default" as
"[t]he omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty").
' See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (noting that waiver depends on a party's "choice").
'0 See Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2007)
(waiver by litigation conduct); Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 2005) (waiver by litigation conduct).
4 AM. JUR. 2DAlternative Dispute Resolution § 105 (2009).
12 See Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 222.
13 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 105.
14 See discussion infra Part III.
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court to decide have done so only in the context of litigation
conduct. Recently, however, in JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings,
Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that prelitigation conduct is a
question for the court to decide and not the arbitrator.15
This Note disagrees with Chronimed's holding that waiver
by prelitigation conduct is a question for the court to decide. In
arriving at this conclusion, this Note argues that the persuasive
reasoning used by courts in favor of deciding waiver by litigation
conduct does not apply to waiver by prelitigation conduct because
of the unique differences between the two types of conduct.
Moreover, as a matter of public policy, questions of waiver by
prelitigation conduct are best left to the arbitrator, while
questions of waiver by litigation conduct are best left to the court.
While acknowledging that Supreme Court clarification will
ultimately be needed to resolve the confusion created by the
Howsam decision, this Note concludes by recommending that
waiver by prelitigation conduct be decided by the arbitrator.
Part I of this Note provides the historical relationship between
courts and the arbitration process prior to Howsam. Part II
discusses the Howsam decision. Part III examines the circuit
court split over waiver that has developed as a result of Howsam.
Part IV analyzes the Sixth Circuit's decision in Chronimed and
finds that the court incorrectly held that waiver by prelitigation
conduct was for the court to decide. It further explains why
waiver by prelitigation conduct is best left to the arbitrator to
decide.
I.THE FORCED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COURTS AND
ARBITRATION
A. Long and Hostile History up Until the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925
The history of arbitration in the United States is as old as
the country itself.16 Even during the colonial period, before the
American Revolution, "certain trade groups used arbitration to
15 539 F.3d 388, 394 (6th Cir. 2008); see infra Parts III-IV (Mulvaney and
Chronimed cases provide concrete examples of prelitigation conduct).
16 Peter J. Smith IV, Investors Win: Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
Makes Entering Arbitration Quicker, Easier, and Less Expensive, 4 PEPP. DIsP.
RESOL. L.J. 127, 128-29 (2003).
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resolve disputes among their members." 7  Throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, arbitration continued to
grow as an alternative means of resolving disputes.18 "Despite
the growth of arbitration, [however,] it remained in tension with
the courts."' 9
Initially, courts "believed arbitration agreements were
subject to the 'revocability doctrine', i.e., an agreement to
arbitrate was revocable by either party until an award was
given."2° Therefore, while most courts would enforce awards that
were rendered in arbitration, they refused to grant specific
performance to a party seeking enforcement of an agreement to
arbitrate.2' In fact, the Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v.
Morse22 justified this refusal to recognize arbitration agreements
by holding that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void. 2 3
To alleviate the tension between judicial resolution and the
arbitration process, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") in 1925.24 "The FAA was intended to overcome the
jealousy of the ... courts for their own jurisdiction."21 Realizing
how strongly courts guarded against dilution of their jurisdiction,
Congress passed the FAA "simply [so] that such agreements for
arbitration [would] be enforced"26 and respected by courts "on the
same footing as other agreements."27 Section 2 of the FAA clearly
states this purpose; it provides "an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
" Id. at 129. "In 1768, the New York Chamber of Commerce created a system to
'settle business disputes according to trade practice rather than legal principles.'"
LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FAMILIES AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (2d ed. 1994)).
18 See Smith, supra note 16, at 129. "By 1927, the American Arbitration
Association's Year Book on Commercial Arbitration in the United States listed over
one thousand trade associations that employed a system of arbitration for dispute
resolution." Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 87 U.S. 445 (1874).
' See Smith, supra note 16, at 130 (quoting Morse, 87 U.S. at 451).
24 Id.
25 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
26 Id. at 130-31 (internal quotations omitted).
27 Id. at 131.
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a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract."
28
While section 2 of the FAA certainly legitimized the
arbitration process, the legislation left open many unresolved
questions as to the exact role courts should play when issues and
disputes over arbitration arise, such as with waiver. This
uncertainty derives from section 3 of the FAA, which addresses
the courts' role in enforcing agreements to arbitrate. Section 3
provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which
such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.29
Section 3 clearly provides that courts are to enforce agreements
to arbitrate when the issue is referable to arbitration under the
agreement at hand.30  The last part of section 3, however,
provides an exception: A court will not enforce such arbitration if
the court finds that the party moving for arbitration is in
"default" in proceeding with such arbitration.3 ' Thus, if the court
finds that the issue it is presented with is not referable to
arbitration or the party seeking the stay of trial is in "default"-
such as when a party has waived its right to arbitration-the
court will not refer the matter to arbitration.32 The court also,
under section 4 of the FAA, cannot compel arbitration if the party
moving to compel it has waived the right to arbitrate.33
While the FAA bridged the divide that existed between
courts and arbitration and set out roles for courts in helping to
enforce arbitration, it still left much discretion in the hands of
the courts, which historically were protective of their own
28 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
29 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 Id.
3 6 C.J.S.Arbitration § 57 (2009).
3 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
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jurisdiction.34 In the decades after the FAA was enacted, the
Supreme Court tried to provide guidance to courts regarding how
to best interpret their new role under the FAA. The most
significant decision came in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.35
B. Moses's Attempt To Refocus Courts on the FAA and To
Support Arbitration
In Moses, the Supreme Court attempted to refocus and put
into context Congress's intent in enacting the FAA, which was to
promote the enforcement of arbitration agreements. In Moses,
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (the "Hospital") and Mercury
Construction Corporation ("Mercury") entered into a contract to
construct additions to the Hospital building. 6 The contract
contained an arbitration clause providing that "[a]ll claims,
disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating
to, this Contract or the breach thereof... shall be decided by
arbitration .... ",7 After the completion of construction, Mercury
claimed that it incurred additional costs such as "extended
overhead [and] increase[s] in construction costs due to delay or
inaction by the Hospital."3  After some discussion, the Hospital
refused to pay its claim and filed for a declaratory judgment in
state court, seeking a declaration, among other things, that there
was no right to arbitrate." In its complaint, the Hospital alleged
that Mercury "had lost any right to arbitration under the
contract due to waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make a
timely demand for arbitration."4" Mercury filed an action in
district court, seeking an order compelling arbitration under
section 4 of the FAA.4 The district court stayed the action,42 but
" See Smith, supra note 16, at 130.
35 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
36 Id. at 4.
3 Id. at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 6.
9 Id. at 6-7.
o Id. at 7. 'The basic issue presented in Mercury's federal suit was the
arbitrability of the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital." Id. at 24.
" Id. at 7. While section 3 pertains to a party requesting a stay of the suit,
section 4 serves the same purpose in regard to enforcing arbitration-except that it
is in the context of a party petitioning the court for an affirmative order to arbitrate
without a suit already in hand.
Section 4 states:
[Vol. 84:363
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the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the stay and
directed the district court to enter a section 4 order to arbitrate.43
The court held that the dispute was "arbitrable under the
Arbitration Act and the terms of the parties' arbitration
agreement."'
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision.45
In doing so, the Court focused on "Congress's clear intent, in the
Arbitration Act, to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out
of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.4
The Court found that the district court's stay of arbitration
"frustrated the statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed
enforcement of arbitration agreements."47 Most importantly, the
Court acknowledged in Moses that the FAA "requires a liberal
reading of arbitration agreements"4" and that "questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration."49 Specifically, the Court held
that the FAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."50 This holding-
along with the specific language of "waiver, delay, or a like
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition ... for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement.... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing
the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
42 Imre S. Szalai, The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 84 (2004) ("[Tlhe federal court stayed
the action pending resolution of the Hospital's declaratory judgment action in state
court.").
4 Id.
Moses, 460 U.S. at 29 (citing In re Mercury Const. Corp., 656 F.2d 933, 946
(4th Cir. 1981)).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 22.
47 Id. at 23.
' Id. at 22 n.27.
49 Id. at 24.
50 Id. at 24-25.
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defense"-was later used by the Howsam Court and led to the
circuit court split over waiver that is analyzed in this Note. 1
II. HOWSAM DECISION: FOCUSING ON PARTY EXPECTATIONS
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Karen Howsam
alleged that her financial advisor, Dean Witter, misrepresented
the virtues of a partnership that the firm had recommended she
purchase.52 This controversy fell within the terms of the broad
arbitration agreement that the parties had signed.53  The
arbitration agreement provided that Howsam could choose the
arbitration forum; she chose the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 54 NASD rules provided that "no
dispute 'shall be eligible for submission.., where six (6) years
have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to
the.., dispute.' ,,55 Dean Witter filed suit in court, asking "the
court to declare that the dispute was 'ineligible for arbitration'
because it was more than six years old." Additionally, Dean
Witter sought an injunction that would "prohibit Howsam from
proceeding in arbitration."57 The district court dismissed the
action "on the ground that the NASD arbitrator, not the court,
should interpret and apply the NASD rule."5 8 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the
"application of the NASD rule presented a question of the
underlying dispute's 'arbitrability'; and the presumption is that a
court, not an arbitrator, will ordinarily decide an 'arbitrability'
question."59
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of
"whether a court or an arbitrator primarily should interpret and
apply this particular NASD rule."6°  The Court reversed the
judgment of the Tenth Circuit, holding that the NASD rule was
"' See LeFevre, supra note 1, at 310-11. "The federal circuits later diverged from
their fairly consistent waiver analysis, particularly in their attempts to interpret the
Supreme Court's discussion of arbitrability in Howsam ... ." Id.
52 537 U.S. 79, 81 (2002).
5 Id.
Id. at 82 (quoting NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10304).
6 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
5 Id.
5 Id.; see, e.g., First Options of Chi. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995).
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82-83.
[Vol. 84:363
COURT v. ARBITRATOR
for an arbitrator to interpret and apply.6" In its opinion, the
Supreme Court established a framework for courts to use in
determining which gateway questions such as waiver were for
the courts to decide and which were reserved for arbitrators.62
The Court understood that "[1]inguistically speaking, one might
call any potentially dispositive gateway question a 'question of
arbitrability,' for its answer will determine whether the
underlying controversy will proceed to arbitration on the
merits."63 The Court, however, found that not all gateway
disputes are "questions of arbitrability," which a court should
decide and that the phrase itself "has a far more limited scope."'
In reviewing its own case law, the Court found the phrase
"question of arbitrability"
applicable in the kind of narrow circumstances where
contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have
decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have
thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so,
and, consequently where reference of the gateway dispute to the
court avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that
they may well not have agreed to arbitrate. 65
Thus, focusing on party expectations, the Court distinguished
between questions of arbitrability for a court to decide and those
gateway questions more appropriately left to the arbitrator. The
Court defined questions of arbitrability as questions pertaining
to the existence of a binding arbitration agreement and questions
as to whether an issue is within the scope of an existing
agreement.66  Conversely, gateway questions that were not
61 Id. at 86.
62 Id. at 83-86.
6 Id. at 83.
64 Id.
6 Id. 83-84.
" See Szalai, supra note 42, at 82; see also Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84. The
Howsam Court looked to prior Supreme Court decisions in formulating its view:
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-46 (1995) (holding that a
court should decide whether parties who do not sign an arbitration agreement are
bound by the contract); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651-
52 (1986) (holding that a court should decide whether a labor-management layoff
issue is governed by the arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement);
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (holding that a court
should decide whether an arbitration agreement continues after a corporate merger
and binds the resulting corporation); and Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S.
238, 241-43 (1962) (holding that a court should decide whether a clause authorizing
arbitration for "grievances" covers claims for damages for breach of a no-strike
20101
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"questions of arbitrability," and thus were not to be decided by
courts, related to "general circumstance[s] where parties would
likely expect that an arbitrator would decide the gateway
matter."67 Specifically, "'procedural questions which grow out of
the dispute and bear on its final disposition' are presumptively
not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide" 68 Thus, the
Court divided gateway questions into two broad categories:
(1) substantive questions, which are the "questions of
arbitrability" for judges to decide-such as the existence and
scope of an arbitration agreement; and (2) procedural questions,
which are for arbitrators to decide.69
In reaching its decision, the Court looked to the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 ("RUAA"), which provided that
"an arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to
arbitrability has been fulfilled." 0 The Court quoted comment 2
of the RUAA, which mandated "issues of procedural arbitrability,
i.e., whether prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches,
estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to
arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide."7'
Moreover, in seeking to clarify which gateway questions
were for courts and which were for arbitrators to decide, the
Court focused on the expectations parties have when accepting
an arbitration agreement. As such, the Court held that an issue
regarding NASD's time-limit rule would be expected to fall
within the type of procedural question that an arbitrator would
decide.7 2  Furthermore, the Court concluded that an NASD
arbitrator would be better at interpreting and applying the
agency's own rule than a court.73 The Court noted that "for the
law to assume an expectation that aligns (1) decisionmaker with
(2) comparative expertise will help better to secure a fair and
expeditious resolution of the underlying controversy-a goal of
agreement), overruled by Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235 (1970). Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
67 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
Id. (quoting John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557) (holding that an arbitrator should
decide whether the first two steps of a grievance procedure were completed where
these steps are prerequisites to arbitration) (internal quotations omitted).
69 See LeFevre, supra note 1, at 311.
70 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85 (quoting UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) cmt. 2
(2000)).
" Id. at 85 (quoting UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6 cmt. 2).
72 Id.
73 Id.
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arbitration systems and judicial systems alike." Thus, in
determining the likely expectations of parties to a specific
arbitration agreement, it may be reasonable to weigh the
expertise and efficiency considerations of both the judiciary and
arbitration process in light of the particular issue at hand.
While the Howsam Court established the two sides of the
arbitrability issue and clearly settled that the NASD time-limit
rule was for arbitrators to decide, there is still much uncertainty
about where waiver fits in as a gateway question. Waiver creates
controversy because it is a type of default that can fall on either
side of the issue of arbitrability. For example, the substantive
category of a "question of arbitrability" that a court would be
expected to decide is comprised of questions regarding the
existence and scope of an arbitration agreement. The court's role
in determining whether an arbitration agreement exists could be
applied to a situation involving waiver since acts of waiver could
effectively nullify an arbitration agreement, and therefore, bring
into question the agreement's existence. Conversely, questions of
waiver could also fall within the category of a procedural
question. While the NASD time-limit rule embodies a-specific
prerequisite type of question, it is conceivable that waiver-
whether by litigation conduct or prelitigation conduct-may
actually be of a similar type of procedural nature that one would
find an arbitrator most suited to handle. In fact, the Howsam
Court, in the middle of its explanation of procedural questions,
actually mentioned waiver.7 " The Howsam Court, citing Moses,
proclaimed, "[s]o, too, the presumption is that the arbitrator
should decide 'allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.' "76
It is reasonable to argue, however, that the word "waiver" in
Howsam was not meant to encompass the voluntary renunciation
of the right to arbitrate by litigation and prelitigation conduct
since the word itself is often broadly used to symbolize many
types of procedural defaults in which a party loses the right to
compel arbitration. Therefore, until the Supreme Court clarifies
what it meant by "waiver," specifically, whether the term
includes waiver by litigation and prelitigation conduct and on
74 Id.
15 Id. at 84-85.
76 Id. at 84 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 25 (1983)).
2010]
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which side of the issue of arbitrability waiver falls, waiver will
continue to float in a grey area between court and arbitrator.
III. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON WAIVER
Some circuit courts have held that issues of waiver by
litigation and prelitigation conduct after Howsam must be
decided by an arbitrator. Other circuits, however, have held that
the traditional rule that waiver is for a court to decide is still
intact and even supported by the Howsam decision." These
circuits, until recently, have limited this holding to waiver by
litigation conduct. In JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc.,
however, the Sixth Circuit held that waiver by prelitigation
conduct is also for the court to decide.78
A. Circuit Courts That Find Waiver by Litigation Conduct and
Prelitigation Conduct To Be a Question for Arbitrators To
Decide
The circuit courts that hold that waiver is a question for an
arbitrator simply quote and rely on the language in Howsam,
discussed above. As a result of Howsam incorporating Moses's
pro-arbitration language regarding "waiver, delay, or a like
defense" into the category of procedural arbitrability, these
circuit courts find the issue clearly for an arbitrator. These
courts have reversed the traditional notion that waiver is a
question for courts to decide.7 9
The Eighth Circuit, in National American Insurance Co. v.
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co.,80 summarily
dismissed petitioner's argument that "because respondent chose
to litigate in state court other disputes involving the same
contracts, respondent thereby waived its right to arbitrate the
instant dispute."8 ' In its reasoning for dismissing the issue, the
Eighth Circuit simply cited Howsam for the proposition that "the
presumption is that the arbitrator should decide 'allegations of
"' See generally LeFevre, supra note 1.
78 539 F.3d 388, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2008).
71 See LeFevre, supra note 1, at 311.
80 328 F.3d 462 (8th Cir. 2003).
"' LeFevre, supra note 1, at 312.
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waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.' ",82 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit held that an issue of waiver by litigation conduct
was for an arbitrator to decide.
Likewise, the Second Circuit, in Mulvaney Mechanical, Inc.
v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n, Local 38, came to the
same conclusion regarding waiver by prelitigation conduct.8 3 In
Mulvaney, a dispute arose between Mulvaney Mechanical, Inc.
("Mulvaney") and Sheet Metal Workers International
Association, Local 38 (the "Union"), over a collective bargaining
agreement (the "CBA"). 4  The two parties were trying to
negotiate a renewal of the CBA, which was set to expire on June
30, 1997.5 They could not, however, reach an agreement.8 6
Therefore, on June 25, 1997, the Union instructed its members to
strike.
During the summer and fall, the parties again tried but were
unsuccessful in negotiating a new contract.8 8 Therefore, in
November, the Union sought arbitration in order to reach a new
agreement.8 9  The CBA contained an arbitration provision,
providing that "any controversy or dispute arising out of the
failure of the parties to negotiate a renewal of [the CBA shall" go
to arbitration.9 ° The CBA, however, also contained a no-strike
provision establishing that the parties would "not engage in a
strike or lockout until the ... arbitration process had run its
course."91 In light of this provision and the Union's conduct, the
employer made two arguments:
(1) the agreement had been terminated by the employees' strike
in violation of both the collective bargaining agreement and the
National Labor Relations Act's notice requirements; and (2) the
strike, coupled with the union's subsequent pronouncements
82 Transamerica, 328 F.3d at 466 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
83 351 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2003).
84 Id. at 44.
Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 38, No.
3:98CV1750 RNC, 2000 WL 852430, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2000), vacated, 288
F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2002), vacated, 538 U.S. 918 (2003).
8 Id. at *1-2.
87 Id. at *1.
88 Id. at *2.
89 Id.
90 Id. at *1 n.2.
91 Id. at *1.
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that the agreement had been terminated, constituted a
repudiation of the agreement, giving Mulvaney the right to
rescind it.92
Addressing the first claim-whether the agreement had been
terminated by the strike-the Second Circuit held that the claim
was "akin to the question of whether a binding agreement to
arbitrate exist[ed] at all, and thus [fell] in the category of
'questions of arbitrability' presumptively reserved for the
courts."93 Conversely, the Second Circuit held that the second
claim-whether the strike, coupled with repudiation of the CBA,
constituted a waiver of arbitration-was for the arbitrator to
decide.94 The court reasoned that the relevant issue was not
whether the CBA still existed. Rather, the issue concerned
whether the existing contract had become voidable, allowing
Mulvaney to rescind the CBA, and thus the arbitration provision
as well. 95  Since "the language of the arbitration clause
encompasses the union's strike and the consequences thereof,"
the court reasoned that this issue of repudiation would clearly be
for the arbitrator to decide.96 Moreover, the court concluded that
the alleged repudiation of the CBA by the Union's prelitigation
conduct-the strike and renouncement of the CBA-was an issue
that "most closely resemble[d] the defenses to arbitrability such
as waiver, estoppel, or delay that the Supreme Court listed as
questions properly decided by arbitrators. "9
B. Circuit Courts That Find Waiver by Litigation Conduct
To Be a Question for Courts To Decide
In interpreting Howsam, the Eighth and Second Circuits
found that waiver by both litigation and prelitigation conduct is a
question for the arbitrator. Other circuits "either have not
directly addressed [Howsam], continuing to apply their
traditional waiver rules,"98 or "have distinguished [Howsam],
92 Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 38, 351 F.3d
43, 45 (2d Cir. 2003).
93 Id. at 46.
9 Id.
95 Id.
9 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Khan v. Parsons Global Serv., Ltd., 521 F.3d 421, 425, 428. (D.C. Cir.
2008) (holding, without mentioning Howsam, that "the question of waiver is one of
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again maintaining the status quo"99 as to the question of waiver
by litigation conduct. Specifically, three circuit courts-the First,
Third, and Fifth-have addressed Howsam's impact on waiver by
litigation conduct and have found that this type of waiver
question is for courts to decide.
The Fifth Circuit, in Tristar Financial Insurance Agency,
Inc. v. Equicredit Corp. of America,'00 held that it was for the
court to decide the issue of waiver by litigation conduct.101
Focusing on party expectations, Tristar quoted Howsam for the
proposition that "[q]uestions of arbitrability are for the court
'where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to
have decided the gateway matter.' "102 In this case, the court held
that "[c]ontracting parties would expect the court to decide
whether one party's conduct before the court waived the right to
arbitrate."13 The Tristar Court reasoned that "waiver in this
case depends on the conduct of the parties before the district
court i.e., waiver by litigation conduct], and the court, not the
arbitrator, is in the best position to decide whether the conduct
amounts to a waiver under applicable law." °4 Thus, the court
concluded that the party seeking arbitration did not waive its
right to arbitrate by "threatening litigation, filing motions in the
district court action, conducting discovery, and waiting eight
months to file its motion to compel arbitration."0 5
Similar to Tristar, the First Circuit, in Marie v. Allied Home
Mortgage Corp.,' 06 concentrated on party expectations when it
addressed whether the court or arbitrator should decide (1) the
issue of waiver of arbitration by failure to timely compel
law" and that "filing a motion for summary judgment based on matters outside of
the pleadings is inconsistent with preserving the right to compel arbitration"
(quoting Nat'l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d
772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
LeFevre, supra note 1, at 311.
'o 97 F. App'x 462 (5th Cir. 2004).
101 Id. at 464.
102 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537
U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
103 Id. (emphasis added).
104 Id.
105 Id.
'o 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
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arbitration and (2) the issue of waiver by litigation conduct.' v
The First Circuit held that the arbitrator should decide the first
issue and that the court should decide the second issue.1
0 8
The First Circuit held that the issue of whether the party
seeking to compel arbitration was untimely in its demand to
arbitrate-because it failed to abide by the contractual time limit
that was specified in the contract-is to be decided by the
arbitrator.19 Citing Howsam, the court found that this "sort
of procedural prerequisite... is presumed to be for the
arbitrator.""0 Moreover, the court reasoned, the arbitrator in
this case might be "expected to have comparative expertise
in determining the meaning of these sorts of contractual
limitations.""' The court relied on Howsam's holding that
procedural gateway questions are for a court to decide, focusing
on the expectation reasoning that the Howsam Court used in
formulating that rule."'
As to the second issue-whether the party seeking to compel
arbitration had "waived its right to arbitration by not filing for
arbitration during and after the [Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission] proceeding"" 3-the First Circuit held that waiver
by litigation conduct is an issue for courts to decide." 4 The court,
using Howsam's expectation argument, held that the Supreme
Court in Howsam "did not intend to disturb the traditional rule
that waiver by conduct, at least where due to litigation-related
activity, is presumptively an issue for the court.""5 It reasoned
that its own long history and the "overwhelming weight of pre-
Howsam authority, which held that waiver due to litigation
conduct was generally for the court and not for the arbitrator,"
created an expectation that the court would decide the issue of
waiver by litigation conduct."16
107 Id. at 3.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 11.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
13 Id. Employee initiated a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") against her employer over a Title VII claim; however her
employer did not seek arbitration during or after the EEOC proceeding was finished.
Id. at3, 11.
114 Id. at 3.
15 Id. at 14.
16 Id. at 11-12.
[Vol. 84:363
COURT v. ARBITRATOR
Moreover, adding statutory support for its conclusion, the
court held that the term "default" in section 3 of the FAA," 7 "has
generally been viewed by courts as including. .. 'waiver,'"118
thereby making the issue one for the courts to decide.
Additionally, the court noted that the RUAA, which Howsam had
quoted from, provides that "[w]aiver is one area where courts,
rather than arbitrators, often make the decision as to
enforceability of an arbitration clause." 1 9
Furthermore, the First Circuit "articulated three policy
reasons why Howsam... [did] not upset the traditional rule that
courts decide waiver by conduct in litigation."2 ° First, "a court
has inherent power to control its docket and to prevent abuse
in its proceedings (i.e.[,I forum shopping)." 2' Second, looking at
the comparative expertise considerations stressed in
Howsam, "[jiudges are well-trained to recognize [this] abusive
forum shopping."'22 Also, "[a] party's conduct in litigation
'heavily implicates judicial proceedings' rather than arbitral
proceedings... and is not likely to engage the court in the merits
of the dispute."'23 Lastly, as discussed in Moses, a key purpose of
the FAA is to permit speedy resolution of disputes. 24 Therefore,
a court, not an arbitrator, should decide waiver based
on litigation conduct because it would be "exceptionally
inefficient" 2 ' to send such an issue to the arbitrator and have the
arbitrator find "that the defendant had waived its right to
arbitrate."26 Consequently, "the case would inevitably end up
back before the.., court with the plaintiff again pressing his
claims." 27
Finally, the First Circuit cited Tristar, in which the court
held that a court should decide waiver by litigation conduct. 128
The court acknowledged that, unlike in Tristar, the litigation
117 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
'i Marie, 402 F.3d at 13.
119 Id. (quoting UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6, cmt. 5 (2000)).
120 LeFevre, supra note 1, at 313.
121 Id. at 313; see also Marie, 402 F.3d at 13.
122 Marie, 402 F.3d at 13; see also LeFevre, supra note 1, at 313.
122 LeFevre, supra note 1, at 313-14 (quoting Marie, 402 F.3d at 13) (internal
quotations omitted).
124 Marie, 402 F.3d at 14.
125 Id. at 13.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 13-14.
128 See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
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conduct in this case "is somewhat unusual in that the claim is of
litigation activity before the EEOC that is inconsistent with a
right to arbitrate, as opposed to activity before a court."12 9
Nevertheless, the First Circuit found that "[c]ourts are still well
suited to determine the sort of forum-shopping and procedural
issues that are likely to arise in litigation before the EEOC, and
sending the waiver issue to the arbitrator would still be
inefficient."130  Thus, the court concluded that waiver by such
litigation conduct, even in a different forum, should be decided by
the court rather than arbitrator. 3 1
Similar to the First Circuit, the Third Circuit concluded that
waiver by litigation conduct was for the court to decide. 32 The
Third Circuit, in Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc. ,'33 "[found]
the First Circuit's thorough analysis convincing" 134  and
"persuasive.' 35 In Ehleiter, Jack Ehleiter, a casino card dealer,
sought damages from Grapetree Shores, Inc. ("GSI")-the owner
of the property the casino was located on-for personal injuries
from an alleged slip and fall accident while walking down an
employee stairway in the casino. 136 The card dealer had signed
an Hourly Employment Agreement with the casino, and "[u]nder
the terms of that Agreement, Ehleiter agreed to arbitrate, inter
alia, all claims ... arising from his employment." 3  Despite this
agreement, however, neither party initially pursued arbitration.
Instead, both parties actively engaged in litigation and extensive
discovery for approximately four years. 38 In fact, arbitration was
pursued by GSI "only one day before the parties' joint final
pretrial statement and proposed jury instructions were due." 39
129 Marie, 402 F.3d at 14.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2007).
133 482 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2007).
134 Id. at 218.
'3 Id. at 217.
136 Id. at 210.
137 Id. at 211.
138 Id. at 210. "Both parties submitted and responded to several sets of
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, took numerous
depositions, and submitted several expert reports." Id.
139 Id.
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The court held that whether the parties had waived the right
to arbitrate-as a result of their participation in litigation-was
an issue for the court to decide.14 ° Similar to the First Circuit in
Marie, the Third Circuit referred to its long history of deciding
"questions of waiver based on litigation conduct." 4' Moreover,
the court agreed with the First Circuit's arguments regarding the
FAA, the RUAA, and its three policy reasons supporting the
holding that waiver based on litigation conduct was indeed for a
court to decide. 42
The Third Circuit also added another dimension to the
argument in favor of courts deciding waiver by litigation conduct.
The Third Circuit proposed that, when properly considered
within the context of the entire opinion, "the Supreme Court's
statement in Howsam that 'the presumption is that the
arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability,' "143 actually refers to "waiver, delay, or
like defenses arising from non-compliance with contractual
conditions precedent to arbitration, such as the NASD time limit
rule at issue in that case, and not to claims of waiver based on
active litigation in court."' 4" Moreover, the court stated that in
its view, Moses "established only that arbitrability defenses such
as waiver should be 'addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration,' not that these defenses
should presumptively be resolved by an arbitrator."14 In further
support of this assertion, the court cited Germany v. River
Terminal Railway Co.,'46 which was cited in Moses.'47  In
Germany, the court decided the question of waiver based on
litigation conduct itself and did not submit the question to the
arbitrator. 148
140 Id. at 209-10.
141 Id. at 217.
142 See id. at 217-18.
11 Id. at 218-19 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (internal quotations omitted)).
14 Id. at 219. The court does not provide examples of what would constitute
procedural waiver, but makes this comment in order to reaffirm that an arbitrator
should deal with only questions that refer to the contractual and procedural aspects
of the arbitration agreement, which thus would not include waiver, as so defined in
this Note, by litigation or prelitigation conduct.
141 Id. at 219 n.10 (quoting Moses, 460 U.S. at 24).
14 477 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1973).
147 Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 219 n.10.
148 Id.
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IV. THE CHRONIMED DECISION: WRONG ON THE QUESTION OF
WAIVER BY PRELITIGATION CONDUCT; WAIVER BY PRELITIGATION
CONDUCT BELONGS TO THE ARBITRATOR
As demonstrated, Tristar, Marie, and Ehleiter, taken
together, formulate a cohesive argument based on case history,
statutory interpretation, and, most importantly, public policy
that courts should decide the issue of waiver by litigation
conduct. These arguments-used in support of courts
determining waiver by litigation conduct-however, do not apply
equally to waiver by prelitigation conduct. The arguments of
efficiency and party expectations that developed from these three
circuit court cases only support a court deciding questions of
waiver by litigation conduct. When such arguments are applied
to the question of waiver by prelitigation conduct, however, they
cut the other way. Public policy arguments-specifically matters
of efficiency and party expectations-set forth by the FAA, Moses,
and Howsam support waiver by prelitigation conduct being a
question best left to the arbitrator. 149 Thus, the Sixth Circuit in
JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc. 150 misapplied the rationale
provided by Tristar, Marie, and Ehleiter and incorrectly held that
the issue of waiver by prelitigation conduct is for the courts to
decide.' 5 '
A. Facts of Chronimed
In October 2005, Chronimed Holdings, Inc. ("Chronimed")
purchased Northland Pharmacy, a drugstore, from James P.
DiCello. 1"' As part of the deal, the parties negotiated an
employment agreement under which DiCello would continue to
help run the drugstore until the end of 2006.153 Furthermore,
"[o align their interests.. . and as part of arriving at a
fair purchase price, Chronimed agreed to pay DiCello an
'additional purchase price payment' based on Northland's 2006
[Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization("EBITDA")] .,4
149 See infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
10 539 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2008).
'5' See infra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
152 Chronimed, 539 F.3d at 389.
15 Id. at 389-90.
" Id. at 390. The additional payment, if the EBITDA exceeded $2.7 million,
would equal the excess amount. Id.
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At the end of 2006, Chronimed notified DiCello that the
EBITDA did not reach the agreed-upon level, and therefore,
DiCello would not receive an additional payment.155  DiCello
objected to the calculation of the EBITDA, "complaining that
Chronimed depressed Northland's earnings by shortchanging
some aspects of the operations and poor decision-making[,]" 15 6
and, in keeping with the arbitration provision of the
parties' purchase agreement, notified Chronimed in writing.
157
Chronimed responded with a letter on July 6, 2007, that
"disputed [DiCello's] allegations and took the position that his
objection failed to contest the company's EBITDA calculation in
sufficient detail.... Nonetheless, the company invited DiCello to
meet to 'discuss this matter with a view toward an amicable
resolution.' "158 Shortly thereafter, DiCello sued Chronimed in
federal court. 159 In response, Chronimed moved to stay the suit
and compel arbitration. 6 ° The district court denied the motion,
finding that the issue of waiver was for the court to decide and
that Chronimed had waived its right to invoke arbitration when
it sent the July 6 response letter.'16
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the question of
waiver by prelitigation conduct was for the court to decide but
found that the July 6 response letter did not waive Chronimed's
right to arbitrate. 62 In justifying its jurisdiction, the Chronimed
Court looked to the Third Circuit's decision in Ehleiter and the
155 Id.
156 Id. The court found that, while this issue perhaps did not specifically entail
the calculation of the EBITDA, it did fall within "issues having a bearing on such
dispute" and therefore was within the scope of the arbitration provision. Id. at 391
(internal quotations omitted).
157 The Purchase Agreement at § 2.3(b) reads:
If Sellers [DiCello and family's] Representative disagrees with Buyer
[Chronimed's] calculation of the Company [Northland's] EBITDA, Sellers'
Representative shall advise the Buyer in writing .... In the event Buyer
and Sellers' Representative are unable to resolve such dispute within 15
Business Days after delivery of the Objection Notice... such dispute shall
be submitted to, and all issues having a bearing on such dispute shall be
resolved by the Accounting Referee .... The Accounting Referee's
resolution of such dispute shall be final, conclusive and binding on the
parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
158 Id. at 390.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 394.
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First Circuit's decision in Marie, concluding that the reasoning
used in those cases applied equally to the facts in the present
case. 163 The Chronimed Court, however, failed to recognize that
the Ehleiter and Marie decisions, addressing issues of waiver by
litigation conduct, do not support the court deciding issues of
waiver by prelitigation conduct.
B. Chronimed's Reliance on Ehleiter Is Misplaced
The Chronimed Court begins its analysis by admitting that,
"when read in isolation," the Howsam Court states that waiver is
for an arbitrator to decide. 164  They dismiss, however, this
isolated reading using the same reasoning in Ehleiter; namely
that, when taken within the context of the whole decision, the
Howsam Court was only referring to types of waiver that arose
from "non-compliance with contractual conditions precedent to
arbitration, such as the NASD time limit rule."165 Applying this
more narrow reading of Howsam, the Chronimed Court held that
the July 6 response letter was not a "contractual condition[]
precedent to arbitration."6 6 Therefore, it was not the type of
waiver for an arbitrator to decide.
The Chronimed Court, however, failed to consider that
waiver by prelitigation conduct has both substantive and
procedural elements. Thus, waiver by prelitigation conduct could
easily fit in either of the two categories from Howsam:
(1) substantive questions for a court; and (2) procedural questions
for an arbitrator. The mere fact that prelitigation conduct is
different from contractual conditions-such as the NASD time-
limit rule-does not mean that it then must be placed in the
substantive category for courts to decide. Chronimed's reasoning
does not advance any public policy argument as to why waiver by
prelitigation conduct should be for the court to decide.
16 Id. at 394 n.1.
16 Id. at 393.
' Id. at 393-94 (quoting Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 219
(3d Cir. 2007)) (italics omitted).
" Id. at 394 (quoting Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 219) (italics omitted).
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C. Chronimed's Reliance on Marie Is Misplaced
The Marie Court made clear that the question before it
pertained only to waiver by litigation conduct. 167  The court
stated, "[w]e do not here discuss the proper presumptive division
of labor as between courts and arbitrators for non-litigation-
related waiver claims or for other doctrines that are sometimes
(erroneously) referred to as waiver, such as laches.""6 ' The Marie
Court's entire argument was specifically structured around the
fact that the conduct it was addressing was "litigation"
conduct. 169 The litigation aspect of the conduct in Marie provided
the entire basis for the court to justify why the question of waiver
by litigation conduct should be for the court to decide.
Chronimed failed to recognize the difference between litigation
conduct and prelitigation conduct, and therefore, the court
incorrectly used the reasoning in Marie to validate its decision on
prelitigation waiver.
Additionally, the Chronimed Court misapplied the three
policy reasons provided by the Marie Court in support of giving
the question of waiver by litigation conduct to the court to
prelitigation conduct. The first two policy reasons proffered by
Marie relate to forum shopping and a court's inherent right to
protect itself from such abuses, as well as the court's own
expertise in identifying abuses of the court system. 170 First,
Marie acknowledged a court's power and right to control its own
docket and to prevent abuse in its proceedings, such as forum
shopping. Prelitigation conduct, such as the July 6 response
letter, however, is conduct that takes place before litigation and
167 The Marie Court does not refer to the conduct before them as "prelitigation"
conduct, as suggested in note 1 of Chronimed. Id. at 394 n.1; see Marie v. Allied
Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005). Chronimed attempts to label it
as prelitigation conduct because the conduct in Marie was not litigation conduct
before the Marie court, but was litigation conduct before the EEOC. However, it is
still litigation conduct regardless of whether it was in front of its own court or
another.
168 Marie, 402 F.3d at 14 n.9.
169 Id. at 14. When the Marie court discussed the meaning of "default" under
section 3 of the FAA as incorporating waiver, it noted that one of the cases it derived
this from actually held that "only waiver due to the pursuit of legal remedy
inconsistent with arbitration is a 'default' under 9 U.S.C. § 3." Id. at 13 (citing
County of Middlesex v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1971)) (emphasis
added).
170 See supra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
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is outside the realm of a court room. Therefore, this reasoning
cannot be used to support giving the question of waiver by
prelitigation conduct to the court.
Secondly, Marie compared the expertise of the courts and
arbitrators, finding that "Ijiudges are well-trained to recognize
abusive forum shopping." 7' Prelitigation conduct, however, does
not involve abusive forum shopping, and therefore, cannot be
used to support taking the question of waiver by prelitigation
conduct from the arbitrator. When dealing with waiver by
prelitigation conduct, however, the issue does not call upon the
court's expertise nor does it involve the court's inherent right of
protection from abuse because the conduct at issue takes place
outside of the courtroom and litigation process. Therefore, when
the question refers to waiver by prelitigation conduct, the court
has no advantage over an arbitrator in answering this particular
waiver question.
Thirdly, Marie found that it was inefficient for a court to
send a question of waiver to an arbitrator. "A waiver defense is
raised by one party to a lawsuit in response to another party's
motion to compel arbitration or stay judicial proceedings . "...,172
Agreeing with Marie, the Chronimed Court found that it would
be inefficient to send a question, which is presently in front of the
court, to the arbitrator "because just deciding that a party waived
arbitration fails to advance the substance of the case-it just gets
referred back to the court."'73 Moreover, the Chronimed Court
found that deciding the question of waiver by prelitigation
conduct " 'will help better to secure a fair and expeditious
resolution of the underlying controversy[J'" as quoted in
Howsam. 1
74
The Chronimed Court failed, however, to see that the
efficiency argument was specific to litigation conduct. The Marie
Court wanted courts to decide the question of waiver by litigation
conduct because of the expertise of the judges in dealing with
conduct pertaining to litigation and the court system. In fact, the
quote in Howsam regarding "fair and expeditious resolution" is
not so much an argument about what is more efficient, but is
171 Marie, 402 F.3d at 13.
172 Id.
173 JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 394 (6th Cir. 2008).
171 Id. at 392 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85
(2002)).
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discussed in the context of matching the decision maker with
comparative expertise. 75 Thus, while courts have expertise in
dealing with forum shopping and other abuses of the court, these
issues are not implicated in prelitigation conduct. If deciding
whether an arbitrator or court should hear the issue were
solely about efficiency and minimizing the different forums an
arbitration issue had to travel between, then Howsam would
simply have left all such questions of default to the court.
Instead, the Howsam Court explained that some questions were
better suited for the arbitrator-even if there existed the chance
it would be sent back to the court.
Moreover, efficiency can be advanced when dealing with
questions of waiver by prelitigation conduct by giving such
questions to the arbitrator. As noted in Moses, the FAA requires
that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."'76 Specifically,
Moses held that the FAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand
is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."77 While
Ehleiter correctly noted that Moses did not specifically say that
waiver should be decided by an arbitrator, it is clear from Moses
that the FAA strongly emphasizes efficiency in handling disputes
related to arbitration and, in light of such policy, establishes that
issues of waiver should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 7 8
Thus, under FAA policy, prelitigation conduct is certainly less
likely to waive arbitration, and therefore, efficiency dictates that
such an issue be sent to the arbitrator to decide-rather than to
the court, where, after all, a ruling against waiver would only
route the case to the arbitrators to begin arbitration proceedings.
Therefore, with the scale tipping in support of promoting
arbitration and without other types of expertise considerations, it
would be more efficient and more consistent with party
expectations to have questions of waiver by prelitigation conduct
answered by the arbitrator.
"I Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
176 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
177 Id. at 24-25.
178 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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Although the First Circuit in Marie laid out three strong
policy reasons-abuses of court proceedings, comparative
expertise, and speedy resolution of disputes179-as to why the
question of waiver by litigation conduct should be for a court to
decide, these policy reasons do not support the same conclusion
when applied to the question of waiver by prelitigation conduct.
The first two policy reasons, given by the Marie Court, simply do
not apply to prelitigation conduct at all because they are
specifically geared to litigation conduct. The last policy reason,
which focuses on efficiency, is broad enough to apply not only to
waiver by litigation conduct, but also to waiver by prelitigation
conduct; however, the efficiency argument has the opposite result
in the waiver by prelitigation conduct context. The most efficient
means by which to handle a dispute involving waiver by
prelitigation conduct is for the arbitrator to decide the issue.
D. Turning to Public Policy for Guidance
In light of the public policy favoring efficiency and resolution
in conformity with party expectations, courts should decide
questions of waiver by litigation conduct, whereas arbitrators
should decide questions of waiver by prelitigation conduct. In
situations involving waiver by litigation conduct, it is more
efficient for a court to handle such issues because such conduct
occurs within the courtroom and under the watchful eye of the
court. Moreover, party expectations are more likely to be
honored when courts address waiver by litigation conduct
because the court is in the best position to understand such
conduct and realize abuses of its own system.
In contrast, the concerns of efficiency and party expectations
favor arbitrators deciding questions of waiver by prelitigation
conduct. Unlike litigation conduct, prelitigation conduct occurs
outside the courtroom and thus is not the type of conduct that a
court already has an invested stake in or an inherent expertise in
handling. Additionally, prelitigation conduct often functions as a
means of delay and is insufficient to constitute waiver. Thus, it
would be more efficient to direct such issues to arbitrators in the
first instance, rather than wasting time, money, and effort
volleying the issue between the court system and arbitration.
Moreover, since parties who agree to an arbitration provision and
179 See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
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never enter the court system would most likely expect such
issues to be resolved by arbitration, it is more in keeping with
party expectations to allow the arbitrator to decide issues of
waiver by prelitigation conduct.
CONCLUSION
The history of arbitration-including pivotal moments such
as the FAA, Moses, the RUAA, and the Howsam decision-
illustrates that the overall arch in the relationship between
courts and the arbitration process continues to bend towards
support for arbitration. Courts, however, as evidenced by the
circuit court split, are still struggling to construe their own roles
in the arbitration process. While Howsam helped define more
succinctly the roles of courts when certain questions of
arbitration are at stake and established the substantive and
procedural categories in which these questions fall, waiver exists
in a grey area because it has both substantive and procedural
elements.
The Supreme Court will eventually be needed to resolve the
existing circuit court split. Until that time comes, however, the
circuit courts should look to public policy and hold that for
efficiency reasons the question of waiver by prelitigation conduct
best belongs with the arbitrator. Thus, as the First, Third, and
Fifth Circuits held, while waiver by litigation conduct is a
question for the court, prelitigation conduct-despite the Sixth
Circuit's ruling in Chronimed-is different from litigation
conduct and, for efficiency reasons, is a question best left to the
arbitrator.
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